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Many instances of social interaction display either or both of the following well-documented
phenomena. People tend to interact with similar others (homophily). They also tend to treat
others of shared social identity more favorably (in-group bias). While both phenomena
involve some degree of discrimination towards others, a systematic study of their relations
and interplay is yet missing. In this paper we report the ﬁndings of an experiment designed
to address this issue. Participants are exogenously and randomly assigned to one of two
groups. Subsequently they play a sequence of eight games with either an in-group or an out-
group member. In treatment EXO in- and out-group matches are formed exogenously, while
in ENDO participants can choose between in- and out-group matches. We ﬁnd strong evi-
dence of in-group bias in EXO, and strong evidence of homophily in ENDO. In-group biases,
however, either decrease or disappear altogether under endogenous matching. We show
that self-selection of homophilous agents into in-group matches cannot explain this fact. We
also ﬁnd that homophily is strongly correlated with risk aversion, and we build on this
evidence to derive a rationale for both the existence of homophily and the disappearance of
in-group biases under endogenous matching.
& 2016 Elsevier B.V. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
Socio-economic discrimination refers to the widespread inﬂuence of various dimensions of people's identity on their
choices and socio-economic opportunities. Depending on the context, discrimination may affect either the formation of
social contacts, or the way in which people treat their counterparts in economic transactions, or both. Homophily – the
tendency of people to interact with similar others – is a well-documented feature of most social networks, and is present
along many dimensions of similarity (such as ethnicity, gender, and religious views) and typologies of social ties (from the
intimate relations of friendship and marriage to business collaborations and everyday interactions). In-group bias – the
tendency to treat others more favorably if they are perceived to belong to the same group – has been well-documented in
social identity research both in Social Psychology and more recently in Economics. Both phenomena have important welfare
consequences, and the range of related policy issues includes the discussion about “parallel societies” (sex-) segregated
education, the costs and beneﬁts of cultural diversity, the management of ethnic conﬂicts and the design of fair and efﬁcient
matching institutions among many others.
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Despite the fact that both homophily and in-group bias reﬂect some degree of discrimination towards others, a sys-
tematic joint analysis of these phenomena and of their interplay is yet missing. The segregation of social contacts implied by
homophily may both affect and be affected by discrimination in economic transactions. Homophily might for example
originate from a rational reaction to the expectation of preferential treatment from the opponent, i.e. to the anticipation of
in-group biases. Hence homophily might be a consequence of in-group biases. On the other hand, by affecting the patterns
of interaction in favour of homogeneous contacts, homophily may also affect agents' behaviour and in-group bias.
In this paper we study homophily and in-group bias in a controlled laboratory experiment. Participants are randomly
assigned to one of two groups, called the RED group and the BLUE group, with no further identity enhancing activity. We
adopt, hence, what is called the “near-minimal” group design paradigm (see Tajfel et al., 1979 and the literature cited below).
Choosing such an arbitrary assignment to minimal groups reduces the possibility that stereotypes’ or prejudices’ partici-
pants may have about speciﬁc identities, such as gender, ethnicity or religion are triggered in the experiment. Everything
participants know about the participant(s) they interact with in the experiment is whether s/he is from the RED or
BLUE group.
Most of our results come from the analysis of two treatments, that differ in the adopted matching institution: EXO, in
which participants are matched according to a colour-blind uniform random process, and ENDO, in which participants are
allowed us to affect their probability of being matched with RED and BLUE types (see below for details). After matching has
occurred, in both EXO and ENDO participants play a series of 8 games designed to elicit their degree of altruism, positive
reciprocity and negative reciprocity.2
In treatment ENDO homophily is measured by the willingness of participants to be matched with opponents from the
same RED/BLUE group. We elicit two measures of homophily. First we ask for a (non-incentivised) expression of preference
for a RED or BLUE match. Second, we elicit participants' willingness to pay (wtp) for an in-group (or out-group) match.3
Participants are then matched according to their wtp, such that agents with a higher wtp for an in-group (out-group) match
are more likely to be matched with in-group (out-group) opponents. Afterwards we let participants play the 8 games.
We ﬁnd evidence of pervasive homophily even in our minimal setting. About 45% of participants in treatment ENDO
indicate a strictly positive wtp for an in-group match and 70% indicate a (weak) preference for an in-group match. We also
record signiﬁcant in-group bias in the EXO treatment. Participants are about 34% more likely to reward an in-group match,
but 39% less likely to punish an in-group match compared to out-group matches.
However, while we ﬁnd substantial in-group biases in EXO, in-group biases either decrease or vanish altogether in the
ENDO treatment. More precisely, while in EXO participants are 34% more likely to act positively reciprocal and 39% less
likely to act negatively reciprocal in in-group matches compared to out-group matches, there is no statistically signiﬁcant
difference between the two in ENDO. This evidence leads to a ﬁrst key insight: to the extent that participants' expectations
are correct, homophily cannot stem from strategic anticipation of in-group bias. This is also conﬁrmed by a comparison of
levels of homophily in ENDO with two benchmark treatments, one with no scope for in-group bias and a second with
substantial scope for in-group bias. We ﬁnd no signiﬁcant difference with the ﬁrst, and signiﬁcantly lower levels of
homophily in ENDO compared to the second.
The substantial reduction of in-group bias in the ENDO treatment provides a second insight: the nature of the matching
institution affects the degree of discrimination in economic transactions. In particular, when homophily is allowed us to
shape the patterns of social interaction, less in-group bias (on average) obtains as a result. We show that self-selection of
homophilous agents into in-group matches cannot, by itself, explain the observed decrease from EXO to ENDO. Some shift in
behaviour must have therefore occurred in response to the change in the matching institution. Somewhat surprisingly, all
this suggests that while homophily does not result from expected in-group bias, the amount of realised in-group bias
depends on whether homophily has a “playing ﬁeld”.
But if not the expectation of preferential treatment, what causes homophily in our experiment? One possible clue might
lie in the evidence we gathered in our post-play questionnaire on risk attitudes, cognitive abilities, gender, age and
nationality. In particular we found that homophily is positively correlated with a (non-incentivised) measure of risk aver-
sion, but not with any of the other measures elicited. In an online questionnaire posted on Amazon Mechanical Turk we then
reproduced this ﬁnding. Respondents who are less willing to take risks tend to be more homophilous. These ﬁndings echo
recent sociological theories, which interpret homophily as a way to reduce subjective uncertainty (Hogg, 2000).4
There is a ﬁnal, somewhat provoking, message coming out of our exercise. Even though more homophily would probably
lead to more discrimination (in-group bias) “for any given matching institution”, letting agents decide about their match
(moving from exogenous to endogenous matching) decreases aggregate discrimination. In particular, letting agents to be in
control of their own economic relations has two opposite effects on social structure and economic outcomes: the degree of
segregation (measured by the share of in-group interactions) will increase due to homophily but, at the same time, social
discrimination (measured by in-group bias) may decrease due to a combination of self-selection and changed individual
behaviour. Hence self-selected segregation need not necessarily be detrimental to the level of pro-social behaviour in a
society and need not increase discrimination. While one should be clear that there is a big gap between the minimal design
2 We use variants of some of the games described in Charness and Rabin (2002).
3 In the experiment we never use the terms in-group or out-group, but only the RED and BLUE group.
4 Shifting the focus on risk attitudes as the primitive source of homophily requires some rationale for agents to perceive in-group interaction as less
uncertain. We discuss possible explanations in detail below.
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in this experiment and the complex life outside the lab, the minimal design has allowed us to uncover a mechanism, which
could potentially be of crucial relevance for the assessment of policies that affect social and economic segregation.
Previous literature has documented homophily in several ﬁeld studies. See e.g. Currarini et al. (2009, 2010), Centola
(2011) or McPherson et al. (2001) for surveys of the sociological literature. As already mentioned above this literature is
mostly focussed on documenting homophily as a biased matching pattern, but has found it difﬁcult to identify the sources of
homophily. To our knowledge there are no systematic experimental studies on homophily yet.5
There has been much more experimental work on in-group bias. A number of papers in psychological research have
found evidence in support of in-group favoritism under a “minimal paradigm” design, where the assignment of agents to
groups is made with no reference to previous interaction, correlation of preferences or pre-formed identities (see the
pioneering work by Tajfel et al., 1979). This has been conﬁrmed in a recent study in experimental economics by Chen and Li
(2009), who have found in-group biases when agents are sorted in an ad hoc manner into two groups labelled with colours
(maize and blue). Our treatment EXO is closely related to the “RandomBetween treatment” in the study by Chen and Li
(2009) and our results from this treatment are in line with their ﬁndings from their “RandomBetween treatment”. Other
work in experimental economics has not found biases in a truly minimal design (see Charness et al., 2007 in the context of
prisoner's dilemma and battle of sexes, Eckel and Grossman, 2005 in the context of team production and Chen and Chen,
2011 in minimum effort games). Strong in-group biases have been found by Chen and Chen (2011), Charness et al. (2007) or
Chakravarty and Fonseca (2014) in designs that were not truly minimal. Ioannou et al. (2016) ﬁnd in-group biases only in
settings where group identity is reinforced by displaying group payoffs. There is also strong evidence of the role of priming
in reinforcing identity-based behaviour and preferences (Benjamin et al., 2010; Van Bavel et al., 2008).
Attempts to study in-group bias when the pattern of interaction is to some extent endogenous include Foddy et al.
(2009) who ﬁnd that agents prefer to receive donations from in-group members rather than from out-group members. They
also show that this can be imputed to the expectation of better treatment inside the group. Our experimental evidence only
partially conﬁrms and points to a perceived reduction in uncertainty as a main motive for homophily (see below). A number
of papers have considered social dilemma games with an endogenous group structure (Coricelli et al., 2004; Keser and van
Winden, 2000; Grimm and Mengel, 2009; Ahn et al., 2009 among others). Since selection and exclusion – that are indeed
found to affect behaviour – are based on behaviour rather than group membership or identity in these studies, they are
somewhat less related to our work. One study where selection and exclusion are based on both behaviour and (possibly
identity enhancing) team building tasks is Charness et al. (2014). They allow for endogenous group formation in three stages
involving expulsion, voluntary exit and reformation in the context of a public good game. They ﬁnd that endowments are
more important than the team-building task in determining segregation.
Our paper is organised as follows: Section 2 describes our experimental design in full detail. Sections 3 and 4 present the
evidence homophily and in-group bias respectively. Section 5 discusses the possible determinants for these phenomena,
and for the decrease in in-group bias under endogenous matching. Section 6 concludes.
2. Design
Our experiment was conducted at the BEE-Lab at Maastricht University between March and May 2011. 258 participants
participated in one of our 5 main treatments. Our basic treatments are treatments ENDO, EXO and CONTROL, which we
describe next.
Treatment ENDO: In treatment ENDO participants were ﬁrst randomly and exogenously allocated to the BLUE and RED
group and informed about which group they belong to. Subsequently the experiment developed as follows: ﬁrst participants
were asked whether they preferred to be matched with a member of the RED or BLUE group. Subsequently (on a new
screen) their willingness to pay (wtp) for their choice was elicited (details on the elicitation mechanism can be found below).
They were then matched with a member of the RED or BLUE group (with probabilities depending on their wtp) and
informed about the group of their match (RED or BLUE). Subsequently the two players in a given match were randomly
allocated the role of Players A and B (with equal probabilities) and played 8 games with their match in ﬁxed sequence.
Table 1 describes the 8 games. They are variants of some of the games described in Charness and Rabin (2002). In Games
1 and 2 there is no choice for Player A and Player B who chooses between two allocations. These games indicate how
altruistically Player B behaves. In all other games Player A moves ﬁrst and either ends the game by picking an allocation or
lets Player B choose, who then chooses between two allocations. Games 3 and 4 indicate how negatively reciprocal Player B
behaves and Games 5–8 indicate how positively reciprocal Player B behaves. We will sometimes distinguish between the
cases where positive reciprocity is inequality decreasing (Games 7 and 8) or increasing (Games 5 and 6). We can also
distinguish whether altruism is inequality decreasing (Game 1) or not (Game 2) and whether negative reciprocity is
inequality decreasing (Game 3) or increasing (Game 4).
Participants in the role of Player B were asked to make a conditional choice indicating what they would do if Player A
decided to let them choose (strategy method). This means we observed the choice of each participant in the role of Player B
irrespective of what Player A did actually choose. Hence even if there is little variation in Player A's behaviour or if Player A's
5 Experimental studies with endogenous group formation that are not directly measuring homophily are discussed below.
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behaviour is very different across treatments, we get a full set of observations from Player B. Participants did not receive
feedback about each other's choices until all eight games had been played. This implies that each participant can be treated
as an independent observation in all the games.
Treatment EXO: Our second treatment (EXO) coincides with ENDO except for the fact that participants were randomly
and exogenously matched with either someone from the RED or BLUE group to play the 8 games. Comparing behaviour in
EXO and ENDO enables us to understand the connection between homophily (which can manifest itself only under
endogenous matching) and in-group biases at the population level.
CONTROL: In our CONTROL condition participants were randomly matched to play the 8 games, but there were no RED or
BLUE groups in this treatment.6 The control condition allows us to see how behaviour is affected by the introduction of
groups. Understanding how the creation of these artiﬁcial differences among our participants affects behaviour has relevant
implications regarding the role of heterogeneity within a society.
Those are our main treatments that we will use to understand homophily and in-group bias. Let us brieﬂy deﬁne these
two key notions, that we will discuss in more detail later.
Homophily: As we mentioned before, by homophily we will refer to a preference for interacting with agents from the
same group. Most of the time, we will measure homophily by the willingness to pay for an in-group match (and heterophily
as the wtp for an out-group match). It is important to note, though, that participants faced two subsequent screens. On the
ﬁrst, they express a non-incentivised preference for RED or BLUE and only on the second screen they are asked for their wtp.
We will use the second measure as a robustness check for some results. Given our design, more homophily (in the sense
deﬁned above) will lead to a higher expected number of in-group matches in the ENDO treatment.
In-group bias: By in-group bias we will refer to differences in choices in the eight games across in- and out-group
matches, which we will measure by the behaviour of Player B.
Additional treatments: We conducted two additional treatments to understand the reasons behind homophily. Both
LOWB and COORD coincide with ENDO, but the 8 games were different in each case. In LOWB games were such that there is
no scope for in-group biases. In other words in LOWB there are no strategic reasons to be homophilous and hence we
consider the amount of homophily observed in this treatment a lower bound. In COORD, however, games were such that
being from the same group could potentially help to resolve coordination problems. Hence we expected there to be more
homophily in COORD compared to ENDO compared to LOWB. Understanding where ENDO lies in the range between LOWB
and COORD can help us understand to which extent homophily is strategic. Sample Games from these treatments can be
found in Appendix G. Table 2 summarises the treatment structure together with the number of (independent) observations
per treatment.7
Mechanism to elicit wtp: We use the following mechanism to elicit the wtp of participants in treatments ENDO, LOWB and
COORD. Participants are endowed with 500 ECU at the beginning of the experiment. This endowment was not given to them
in connection with the elicitation of their wtp. To elicit their wtp they are asked to state a number between 0 and 100 that
indicates how much they would be willing to pay to be matched with their preferred group. We then draw a random
number between 0 and 100 from a uniform distribution. If the randomly drawn number exceeded the number stated by the
participant they were matched randomly. Otherwise they were matched with their preferred group and an amount cor-
responding to their number was deducted from their endowment.8 Since we had a ﬁnite number of participants in the
experiment, there was a small chance that this mechanism is infeasible. In this case (which did not happen) we would have
matched participants randomly and not deducted anything from their endowment. Participants were fully informed about
all these details (see Instructions in Appendix D).
Table 1
The 8 games. Payoffs are in format ðπA ; πBÞ where πi is the payoff of player i.
Game First Mover (A) chooses Second Mover (B) chooses Social Preferences
G1 No choice (400,400) or (750,375) Altruism
G2 No choice (100,300) or (400,200) Altruism
G3 (250,250) or let B choose (100,100) or (500,100) Negative reciprocity
G4 (50,650) or let B choose (0,100) or (100,100) Negative reciprocity
G5 (500,0) or let B choose (300,300) or (600,275) Positive reciprocity (Inequ. increasing)
G6 (250,0) or let B choose (100,100) or (250,50) Positive reciprocity (Inequ. increasing)
G7 (350,100) or let B choose (300,300) or (100,350) Positive reciprocity (Inequ. decreasing)
G8 (400,0) or let B choose (200,200) or (0,400) Positive reciprocity (Inequ. decreasing)
6 Sample instructions for treatments ENDO, EXO and CONTROL can be found in the Appendix.
7 54 additional participants participated in two more treatments LABEL and FIXED. The design and some results of treatment LABEL can be found in the
Appendix. The results of treatment FIXED will be used for another study and are available upon request. Other than the treatments reported we did not run
any additional sessions or treatments, nor did we conduct pilot studies.
8 Participants under this mechanism should maximise wtp100# uIN$uOUT$wtpð Þþ 1$wtp100
! " uIN $uOUT
2
! "
, where uIN is the utility derived from an in-group match
and uOUT the utility they derive from an out-group match. Assuming that uIN4uOUT , the interior optimum is to bid wtp¼ uIN $uOUT4 . If uIN ¼ uOUT , the optimum
is to bid zero and if uINouOUT , the optimum is to bid wtp¼ uOUT $uIN4 for an out-group match.
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Our mechanism is essentially a ﬁrst-price version of the well-known Becker–deGroot–Marschak (BDM) mechanism. The
latter has recently been criticised for being too complex to understand for participants and hence possibly leading to dis-
torted decisions (Cason and Plott, 2014).9 Since in the ﬁrst-price version the price that participants state is also the price
they pay, the ﬁrst-price version is closer to everyday experience of most participants. We, hence, hoped that the ﬁrst-price
version might be easier for participants. In addition to the wtp elicited in this manner we also have the non-incentivised
binary preference for in- and out-group matches (see paragraph “Homophily”).
Minimal group design: The design we used to induce in- and out- groups is called the near-minimal group paradigm in
social psychology (see e.g. Tajfel et al., 1979). According to the near-minimal group design non-overlapping groups are
created using trivial and sometimes meaningless tasks. Group membership has to be anonymous and no social interaction
(face-to-face or computer-mediated chat) should take place between subjects. Summarising 15 years of sociological research
(Tajfel and Turner, 1986) concludes that “the trivial, ad hoc intergroup categorisation leads to in-group favoritism and
discrimination against the out-group”. Chen and Li (2009) have compared ad hoc categorisation according to two colours
(maize and blue) with categorisation according to expressed preferences for paintings by different artists in an economic
experiment. They found that both procedures lead to signiﬁcant in-group biases, while there are no signiﬁcant effects of the
procedure on either size or direction of in-group biases. In our study we used colours RED and BLUE as group labels to avoid
hierarchical labels (such as Groups 1 and 2 or Groups A and B) and to avoid that labels are correlated with things we cannot
control for (such as stereotypes regarding gender and race).
Many studies have shown that expectations about positive and negative reciprocity vary greatly between different
cultures and across genders and there are interaction effects between the two as well. See e.g. Gaechter and Herrmann
(2009) or Bohnet et al. (2010). Hence to be sure that the wtp for in-group matches captures homophily and not e.g. differing
expectations across dimensions such as gender and culture, it is important to use neutral groups. If we used non-neutral
groups (such as e.g. gender), then we could not be sure that what we call homophily does not simply reﬂect a gender
stereotype. Of course in reality gender- and other stereotypes might well create homophily. In this study, however, we want
to focus on deeply rooted culturally learned preferences for in-group matches, which are activated even for meaningless
labels such as RED and BLUE. In a sense we will measure the component of homophily that is common to all dimensions
(race, gender, social status etc.) in which homophily will manifest itself outside the lab. In the instructions we also alternated
between “RED and BLUE” and “BLUE and RED” to avoid creating a hierarchy between the groups. We also test whether the
colour affects behaviour per se and ﬁnd that generally it does not (see Appendix B.3).
The abstract minimal group environment is certainly less rich than the natural environment in the ﬁeld. However, as we
have outlined in Section 1, most existing studies in this literature suffer from the problem, that their environment is “too
rich” to disentangle different sources for homophily and in-group biases. We will see below that our very stylised setting
will help us to identify clear links between these phenomena.
Other details: We used the experimental software z-tree by Fischbacher (2007) and the recruitment system Orsee by
Greiner et al. (2004). Participants were paid the sum of payoffs obtained in all games (with an exchange rate
1 Euro¼500 ECU), a show up fee of 2 Euros as well as (in treatments ENDO, LOWB and COORD) whatever remained from
their initial endowment of 500 ECU. In some of the sessions a participant in the role of Player A was matched to two
participants in the role of Player B. This was done because of low show-up. In this case participants in the role of Player A
only received feedback and payments from one of their matches which was randomly selected. At the end of the experiment
participants ﬁlled in a questionnaire where we elicited their risk aversion and a measure of cognitive ability and asked for
their gender, age and nationality.10 Details on these descriptive statistics in our sample can be found in Appendix A, where
also randomisation checks based on these observables can be found. Each session lasted between 30 min (CONTROL) to
70 min (ENDO) and participants earned on average 13.40 with a minimum of 5.70 and a maximum of 24.60 Euros.
Table 2
Main treatments with number of participants.
Label Matching Minimal groups Games Participants Role B
T1 ENDO Endogenous Yes SocialPreferences 67 40
T2 EXO Exogenous Yes SocialPreferences 73 40
T3 CONTROL Exogenous No SocialPreferences 44 25
T4 LOWB Endogenous Yes No scope for bias 38 –
T5 COORD Endogenous Yes Coordination 36 –
9 See also Plott and Zeiler (2005) and the failed replication by Fehr et al. (2015). Earlier research has questioned the incentive compatibility of the BDM
mechanism pointing out its dependence on the independence axiom (Karni and Safra, 1987), its failure under non-EU preferences (Horowitz, 2006) and
circular validation issues when relying on such mechanisms more generally (Guala, 2000).
10 We also posted an independent questionnaire on Amazon Mechanical Turk to get additional evidence on the correlation between risk aversion and
homophily. More details about this questionnaire are found in Sections 5 and Appendix C.3.
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3. Homophily
We start by assessing how prevalent homophily is in our experiment. To these ends, we deﬁne three types of agents,
based on their declared willingness to pay and on the type of preferred match. Strictly homophilous agents are those with a
strictly positive willingness to pay for an in-group match; Strictly heterophilous agents have a strictly positive willingness to
pay for an out-group match; and Neutral agents have a willingness to pay of zero.
Fig. 1 shows the share of these types in the population. The left-most bar in Fig. 1(a) measures the share of agents that
declared to prefer an in-group match, including those who afterwards declared a willingness to pay of zero. The three right
bars in Fig. 1(a) show the percentages of strictly homophilous, neutral and strictly heterophilous participants in ENDO.
There are about 45% of strictly homophilous agents, about the same proportion of neutral agents, and only few strictly
heterophilous agents that make up for about 10% of the population. Fig. 1(b) shows the distribution (cdfs) of wtp for in-
group and out-group matches, respectively, conditioning on those agents with a weak preference for the respective type of
match. It can be seen that the distribution of wtp for in-group matches dominates that for out-group matches in the sense of
ﬁrst-order stochastic dominance.
The average wtp computed as the average of all agents who stated to prefer an in-group or out-group match (including
neutral agents) is 13.86 for in-group matches and 4.23 for out-group matches. Among strictly homophilous agents the
average wtp for an in-group match is 29.03 and among strictly heterophilous agents it is 23.06.11 In Appendix B we also
compute the ex post optimal bid for an agent who perfectly anticipates in-group biases (discussed extensively in Section 4).
We ﬁnd that this bid is E23. Hence, while many participants put in zero bids, resulting in underbidding on average, those
who display homophily overbid by about 6 units. This could possibly be because they anticipate stronger in-group biases
than there are or because the bidding we observe is largely non-strategic.
Having assessed the presence of substantial homophily in our experimental setting, our aim is to use our controlled
environment to better understand what the sources of homophily in social behaviour are. One natural conjecture is that
agents prefer to match with similar others because they strategically anticipate potential favourable in-group biases in the
interaction to follow, i.e. higher payoffs in in-group matches compared to out-group matches. This conjecture views
homophily as driven by in-group bias, through agents' anticipation of potential gains. To test this conjecture, we compare
our main treatment ENDO to treatments LOWB and COORD. In LOWB, strategic interaction is such that players cannot favour
or discriminate others on grounds of group membership. In other words, in LOWB there is no scope for in-group bias. In
COORD, instead, there are clear incentives for in-group matching (sample games from treatments LOWB and COORD can be
found in Appendix G). Where ENDO stands with respect to these treatments helps us understand to what extent homophily
in ENDO is driven by expected game payoffs. Comparing ENDO and LOWB we record almost no difference in average wtp,
which is even slightly higher in LOWB, and exactly the same percentage of strictly homophilous agents (see Fig. 2). In
contrast, behaviour in treatment COORD signiﬁcantly differs from that in both ENDO and LOWB, both in terms of the average
wtp and in terms of the percentage of agents with a strict preference for an in-group match (two-sided ranksum test,
po0:0019 and po0:0581, respectively). This evidence suggests that while agents do respond for when they face explicit
incentives to bid for in-group matches (as in COORD), the homophily we observe in ENDO is not strategic in that it is not
driven by the anticipation of more favorable treatment in in-groups (or in-group bias). As we will see in Section 4 any
expectation of substantial in-group bias would be misguided, since, as it turns out, in-group biases are statistically no
different from zero in ENDO.
Result 1. Homophily in a minimal design
' There are about 45% of strictly homophilous agents, 45% neutral agents, and 10% strictly heterophilous agents in the ENDO
treatment.
' Homophily is not a matter of opportunities and is not driven by the anticipation of in-group biases in the social preference
games.
We will discuss possible alternative explanations for homophily in ENDO in Section 5. Some of our discussion there will
be based on the relation between in-group bias and homophily, and on how in-group bias and discrimination are affected by
the matching institution. These topics are covered in detail in the next section.
4. In-group bias and the role of the matching institution
We start by giving a descriptive overview of behaviour in the 8 social preferences games, then deﬁne our measure of in-
group bias, and present our evidence for the EXO and ENDO treatments. Descriptive Statistics on all main variables used in
11 The entire distribution of the wtp in treatment ENDO as a bar chart can be found in Fig. 8 in Appendix B. Note that the distribution of the wtp for an
in-group match is not truncated at zero, since agents can pay up to 100 for an out-group match, i.e. to avoid an in-group match. A t test of the one-sided
hypothesis that this (non-truncated) wtp40 returns a p value of 0.0035.
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the following can be found in Table 11 in Appendix A (questionnaire variables) and Table 12 in Appendix B (main experi-
mental variables).
A ﬁrst look at Table 3 suggests that there are not many differences in average behaviour of Player B between ENDO and
EXO. However, there seem to be consistently higher differences between in- and out-group behaviour in treatment EXO
compared to treatment ENDO. For Player A we ﬁnd differences also in means: Player A's seem to be somewhat more willing
to let Player B choose in ENDO (compared to EXO) in positive reciprocity games and less willing in negative reciprocity
games. Below we will try to uncover some of the mechanisms behind these numbers.
We deﬁne in-group bias as the difference in behaviour of Player B between in-group and out-group matches. We focus
on Player B in measuring in-group bias since in-/out-group differences in the behaviour of Player A could be due not only to
a genuine tendency to discriminate between groups (which the notion of in-group bias aims to capture), but also to the
(strategic) anticipation of differential behaviour by Player B in in/out-group matches. Player B, by contrast, moves last and
has therefore no such strategic reasons, and any behaviour differences for Player B are clean evidence of in-group biases.
Since our design does not rely on the strategy method, all participants play the games either in an in-group situation or in
an out-group situation. One advantage is that our design is not leading, since it avoids conditional choices of the type “if I
was matched within the “RED” group I would do this, otherwise I would do that”. Such contingent choices might be seen as
suggestive, i.e. participants might expect that they should choose differently just because a difference is made by the
Fig. 1. 72% of participants prefer an in-group match according to stated preferences. 47% are strictly homophilous, 43% neutral and 10% strictly hetero-
philous according to the elicited wtp. The distribution of wtp for in-group matches ﬁrst-order stochastically dominates that for out-group matches
(Kolmogorov–Smirnov test, po0:0001).
Fig. 2. Comparison of wtp across treatments ENDO, LOWB and COORD. In all treatments bids are signiﬁcantly different from zero in in-group, but not out-
group matches. Bids for an in-group match are statistically indistinguishable in ENDO and LOWB (two-sided ranksum test, p40:4), and signiﬁcantly higher
in COORD compared to either (two-sided ranksum test, po0:0019).
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experimenter.12 The downside of our design is that for any given sample size we will have fewer observations in each
situation and that we cannot directly observe in-group bias at the individual level.13 So, in measuring in-group bias we will
compare the behaviour of different participants in in-group and in out-group matches.
4.1. In-group bias with exogenous matching
We start with treatment EXO, where agents have no way of affecting their matching probabilities. Table 4 shows the
results of simple logit regressions where a binary variable, indicating whether a participant in the role of Player B displayed
altruistic, negatively or positively reciprocal behaviour is regressed on another binary variable that indicates whether
behaviour took place in an in-group match (variable “in-group”). We clustered standard errors by individual, since we
observed each participant in two games for each category. Remember the categories that are altruism (games 1, 2), negative
reciprocity (3, 4), positive reciprocity (inequality increasing case 5, 6) and positive reciprocity (inequality decreasing 7, 8).14
Table 4
In-group bias in EXO. Logit regression. 40 individuals (groups) in the role of Player B, 80 observations. Standard errors clustered by id. 53% of all matches
were in-group matches. nnn1%, nn5%, n10% signiﬁcance.
Games (1) (2) (3) (4)
G1–G2 G3–G4 G5–G6 G7–G8
Altruism Neg. Recp Pos. Recp (i) Pos. Recp (d)
In-group 0.956 $1.841nnn 2.123nn 0.665
(0.651) (0.562) (0.839) (0.589)
Constant $1.825nnn 0.336 $2.398nnn 0.693n
(0.557) (0.441) (0.781) (0.400)
Groups 40 40 40 40
Observations 80 80 80 80
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
n po0:1.
Table 3
Overview of behaviour in treatments EXO and ENDO. Percentages in A columns indicate the frequency with which Player A moves “In”, i.e. lets Player B
choose. Percentages in B columns indicate the mean frequency with which Player B chooses the altruistic (G1–G2), negatively reciprocal (G3–G4) or
positively reciprocal (G5–G8) options, respectively. Numbers in brackets indicate the mean frequency in in- and out-group matches.
Games EXO ENDO EXO ENDO
A A B B
G1 – – 0.30 0.29
– – (0.37,0.23) (0.31,0.27)
G2 – – 0.15 0.28
– – (0.23,0.06) (0.26,0.30)
G3 0.49 0.26 0.37 0.35
(0.53,0.44) (0.24,0.29) (0.18,0.61) (0.43,0.26)
G4 0.61 0.61 0.35 0.18
(0.70,0.50) (0.59,0.69) (0.18,0.55) (0.23,0.15)
G5 0.34 0.34 0.32 0.38
(0.36,0.32) (0.62,0.08) (0.50,0.12) (0.44,0.30)
G6 0.25 0.37 0.23 0.20
(0.30,0.19) (0.62,0.15) (0.37,0.08) (0.29,0.18)
G7 0.16 0.30 0.65 0.65
(0.24,0.07) (0.54,0.08) (0.69,0.62) (0.59,0.70)
G8 0.05 0.15 0.82 0.72
(0.08,0.00) (0.24,0.08) (0.91,0.72) (0.85,0.67)
12 Of course the opposite might also occur and participants might suppress discriminatory tendencies when directly confronted with conditional
choices (Kuklinski et al., 1997).
13 Between subject designs also always rely on the assumption that there is no selection (e.g. on social preferences) into the different treatments.
Randomisation checks in Appendix A show that there was no selection on age, gender, nationality or risk aversion.
14 Since we will pool the two games in each category in the following let us have a brief look at within-pair consistency. The conditional probability to
choose the altruistic option in G2 conditional on having done so in G1 is 0.84 in ENDO and 0.80 in EXO. The conditional probability to choose negatively
reciprocal in G4 conditional on having done so in G3 is 0.98 in ENDO and 0.92 in EXO. The probability to choose positively reciprocal in G6 conditional on
having done so in G5 is 0.78 in ENDO and 0.83 in EXO. And, ﬁnally, the probability to choose positively reciprocal in G8 conditional on having done so in G7
is 0.88 in ENDO and 0.97 in EXO. Individual behaviour is hence reasonably stable across the two games in each category.
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We ﬁnd that there is signiﬁcantly less negative reciprocity in in-group compared to out-group matches (column (2) in
Table 4) and more positive reciprocity in Games 5–6 (where positive reciprocity is inequality increasing) (column (3) in
Table 4). In particular there is a 34% increase in positive reciprocity and a 40% decrease in negative reciprocity in in-group
matches according to the marginal effects of the logit regression below (see also Fig. 3). Those results are consistent with
(Chen and Li, 2009) who, with a within subject design, ﬁnd a 19% increase in positive reciprocity and a 13% decrease in
negative reciprocity in in-group compared to out-group matches. If anything, the in-group biases we ﬁnd are slightly
stronger. This is consistent with evidence from e.g. political science, where it has been found that people tend to suppress
discriminatory tendencies when directly confronted with multiple options (Kuklinski et al., 1997).
Table 5 shows the same regression except that we included additional variables from the questionnaire as well as a
dummy “RED” that takes the value 1 for participants from the RED group to see whether colour matters per se. The
questionnaire variables are age, a gender dummy (1¼ female), a measure of risk aversion and a measure of cognitive
reﬂection. All the variables are described in detail in Appendix C.
Table 5
In-group bias in EXO. Logit regression with additional variables (Standard errors clustered by id). 39 individuals (groups) in the role of Player B, 78
observations. One individual dropped who preferred not to answer gender/age question in questionnaire. 53% of all matches were in-group matches. nnn1%,
nn5%, n10% signiﬁcance.
EXO G1–G2 G3–G4 G5–G6 G7–G8
(“Altruism”) (“Neg. Recp”) (“Pos.Recp.(I)”) (“Pos.Recp.(d)”)
Constant $8.137nn 1.995 $9.746nn 8.944n
(3.741) (4.498) (4.395) (5.029)
In-group 1.816nn $1.572nnn 2.141nnn 1.008
(0.785) (0.605) (0.807) (0.748)
Age 0.069 $0.117 0.288n $0.315
(0.164) (0.187) (0.173) (0.212)
Gender $1.100 0.500 $0.019 $1.706n
(0.697) (0.655) (0.694) (0.904)
RED 2.063n $0.590 0.208 $0.465
(0.917) (0.625) (0.625) (0.672)
Risk aversion 0.591nn 0.221 $0.038 0.265
(0.240) (0.273) (0.252) (0.246)
Cognitive reﬂection 0.902nn 0.054 0.593n $0.527
(0.350) (0.287) (0.320) (0.395)
Groups 39 39 39 39
Observations 78 78 78 78
Robust standard errors in parentheses.
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
n po0:1.
Fig. 3. In-group biases. The graph shows the difference in the percentages of B-players displaying “altruism” (Games 1–2), “negative reciprocity” (Games
3–4), “positive reciprocity” (inequality increasing (Games 5–6)) or “positive reciprocity” (inequality decreasing (Games 7–8)) between in-group matches
and out-group matches. On the left hand side is ENDO and on the right hand side is EXO. nnn1%, nn5%, n10% signiﬁcantly different from zero (minimum
signiﬁcance level across Tables 4, 5, 13, 14 or 6).
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The main message is that in-group biases identiﬁed in Games 3–4 and 5–6 remain signiﬁcant when these variables are
introduced and the coefﬁcients are of about the same size. In fact statistical signiﬁcance is even higher for positive reci-
procity when controlling for these variables (G5–G6). Interestingly a new in-group bias appears for the category Altruism
(Games 1–2) when controlling for these variables. Participants are more altruistic towards in-group members. In addition, it
seems that more risk averse, more cognitively reﬂected people and people from the RED group are more altruistic. We have
no convincing explanation for why more cognitively reﬂected participants might be more altruistic.15 However none of
these variables can robustly explain behaviour in any of the other game categories. The single most important variable is the
in-group dummy.
4.2. In-group bias with endogenous matching
We next measure in-group bias in treatment ENDO with endogenous matching. Our main result here is that when agents
choose who to match with, the aggregate in-group bias either diminishes or totally vanishes in statistical terms. This is
illustrated in Fig. 3, depicting in-group bias in both treatments EXO and ENDO, for the different pairs of games.
One important issue in comparing the EXO and ENDO treatments is that in the latter, whether or not a person ends up in an
in-group match is not exogenous to behaviour. In particular, the same characteristic that leads an agent to show differential
behaviour across in-group and out-group matches may affect that agent's preference over who to be matched with.16 In
Appendix B we reproduce the equivalent of Tables 4 and 5 for treatment ENDO, but because of the endogeneity issue discussed
these tables should be read with care. In addition, to control for the willingness to pay, and therefore isolate the effect of a
match's type on behaviour, we have included the variable “wtp( in-group” in some of the logit regressions reported in Table 13
in Appendix B. The right column for each of the pairs of games shows coefﬁcients where the wtp variable is omitted. We ﬁnd
that, irrespective of whether we control for wtp( in-group or not, the coefﬁcients on in-group are not signiﬁcant. The exception
is a marginally signiﬁcant positive bias for games 5 and 6 (positive reciprocity), which disappears once we control for wtp.
Table 14 in Appendix B shows the results of the same regression as the base regressions in Table 13, but again we have
included some variables from the questionnaire. In this regression as well we do not ﬁnd any signiﬁcant in-group biases for
treatment ENDO. The marginally signiﬁcant coefﬁcient on in-group in Games 5–6 disappears here and instead in-group
appears as marginally signiﬁcant in Games 3–4. Taken together there is no evidence for robust in-group biases in ENDO.
Table 6 shows the correlation coefﬁcients from a Spearman correlation test, where we correlate behaviour with the
binary variable “in-group”. This table illustrates that biases (correlation coefﬁcients) are uniformly larger in EXO compared
to ENDO (in terms of their absolute value) and are only statistically signiﬁcant in EXO, with the exception of a marginally
signiﬁcant coefﬁcient for Games 5 and 6 (positive reciprocity) in ENDO. Again, the evidence from the table conﬁrms pre-
vious analysis: there is little evidence of in-group bias in ENDO.
4.3. Selection
We need to be careful in interpreting the reduction of in-group bias from EXO to ENDO in terms of a change in individual
behaviour. Because of self-selection, homophilous (heterophilous) agents tend to interact in in-group matches more (less)
frequently in ENDO than in EXO. But can this self-selection of types alone explain the observed change in in-group bias? Or
can we conclude that some shift in individual behaviour has happened as a result of the change in the matching institution?
Let us ﬁrst take a step back and note that while self-selection may potentially drive the result, the direction in which it
operates is not obvious. If homophilous agents, for example, displayed more reciprocity in both in- and out-group matches
compared to non-homophilous agents, then we would necessarily have an increase in in-group biases as more homophilous
agents assemble in in-groups in ENDO compared to EXO. If, however, homophilous agents were less reciprocal in all matches
compared to others, we would have a decrease in the bias from EXO to ENDO etc. Hence, it is not sufﬁcient to observe the
direction of the bias to rule out self-selection as the unique cause of the decline in in-group bias.
To do so we have to answer two questions: (i) are there possible realisations of the matching process that can produce
the observed bias in EXO when holding contingent behaviour in ENDO for all three types constant? and (ii) is contingent
behaviour in in-group and out-group matches signiﬁcantly different between ENDO and EXO? We answer these questions
separately for the case of negative and positive reciprocity. Note that by doing so we are testing a weaker hypothesis, since it
is the same realisation of the matching process that has to produce both the bias in negative and positive reciprocity. We
start with the case of negative reciprocity illustrated in Fig. 4(a).
15 Dual process theory sometimes maintains that looking for self-interest is an automated and primed response, while understanding one's ethical
obligations to others is a more conscious and reﬂective process (Moore and Loewenstein, 2004). This could explain why more cognitively reﬂected
participants are more altruistic. Indeed, there is some experimental evidence that delayed/slower decisions imply less negative reciprocity (Grimm and
Mengel, 2011; Oechssler et al., 2015) and more altruism (Piovesan and Wengstroem, 2009) and sometimes also cooperative behaviour (Rand et al., 2012),
even though the latter has not been put in doubt by Tinghoeg et al. (2013) or Recalde et al. (2014). Since we only ﬁnd the effect for altruism and since the
link between cognitive reﬂection and response times seems less than clear (Grossman et al., 2014; Recalde et al., 2014), we do not want to push this
interpretation too much.
16 As we will show below, this is indeed the case. “Homophilous” agents do behave differently from others.
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Negative reciprocity: For all types, negative reciprocity is weakly higher in in-group matches compared to out-group
matches in ENDO. At the same time, in the EXO treatment we observed signiﬁcantly less negative reciprocity at the
aggregate level in in-group compared to out-group matches. Furthermore, in ENDO all types are more negatively reciprocal
in in-group matches compared to average behaviour in in-group matches in EXO (one-sided ranksum test po0:07). And all
types are less negatively reciprocal in out-group matches in ENDO compared to average behaviour in out-group matches in
EXO (one-sided ranksum test po0:01). Hence, even allowing for any distribution of types, there is no realisation of the
matching process that could have produced this outcome without a shift in behaviour.
Positive reciprocity: The case of positive reciprocity is illustrated in Fig. 4(b). Here we see that all types are more positively
reciprocal in out-group matches in ENDO compared to EXO (one-sided ranksum test po0:06).17 This implies that again
there is no realisation of the matching process in EXO that may have generated the observed average level of reciprocity,
clearly demonstrating that self-selection alone cannot explain the changes in aggregate behaviour we observe by moving
from exogenous to endogenous matching.
We can now summarise the main insights we have obtained in this section about the role of the matching institution for
in-group biases.
Result 2. In-group bias and the matching institution
' Aggregate in-group biases vanish or decrease in the transition from exogenous to endogenous matching.
' Self-selection alone cannot explain the change in in-group bias from exogenous to endogenous matching, and a shift in
behaviour due to the change in the matching institution must have occurred.
4.4. Homophily, discrimination and the matching institution
A somewhat provoking implication of the above results is that providing social actors with greater control on their interaction
patterns would decrease discrimination, as behavioural differences between in-group and out-group matches would, on average,
vanish. So, while on one hand endogenising matches have the effect of increasing the degree of segregation of social contacts, on
the other hand they may mitigate the degree of discrimination in social interaction through the joint effect of self-selection and of
the shift in behaviour described above. Two observations, and caveats, are in order here. First, due to the design of our
Fig. 4. Levels of reciprocity in ENDO (by type of matching preference) and in EXO. Remember that 45% of agents are classiﬁed as homophilous and neutral,
respectively and 10% as heterophilous.
Table 6
Spearman correlation coefﬁcients. Correlation between the frequency of altruistic, negatively reciprocal etc. behaviour and in-group match dummy. 40
individuals in the role of Player B, 80 observations. nnn1%, nn5%, n 10%.
ENDO EXO
Altruism (Games 1–2) $0.0314 0.2728n
Neg. Reciprocity (Games 3–4) 0.2363 $0.4551nnn
Pos. Reciprocity (I) (Games 5–6) 0.3103n 0.5392nnn
Pos. Reciprocity (d) (Games 7–8) 0.0205 0.1870
17 We can also conduct this test separately for all types and ﬁnd signiﬁcance levels of p¼0.0929 (strictly homophilous) and p¼0.0656 (neutral) for the
one-sided test, but no signiﬁcance for heterophilous agents due to their small number.
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experiment, the decrease in discrimination does not refer to a change in the behaviour that the same agent adopts in different
types of matches, but rather to the change in the behaviour that is observed, in aggregate, in society in different types of matches.
Second, the fall in discrimination mainly comes from an increase in the punishment adopted in in-group matches and not, as one
may expect or even wish, from an increase in positive reciprocity or even altruism towards out-group opponents.
A related but conceptually different issue is whether increases in homophily would affect the degree of discrimination
for a given ﬁxed matching institution and, if so, in what direction. Fig. 5 shows in-group biases separately for the three
different types of matching preferences in negative and positive reciprocity games (3–4 and 5–6, respectively). In the
positive reciprocity games, we record a signiﬁcant and positive in-group bias only for homophilous agents, while no bias is
present on average for neutral and heterophilous agents. No signiﬁcant bias is present in negative reciprocity games. The
type of bias we ﬁnd in the positive reciprocity games is of the type one would naturally expect: agents that prefer to match
with similar agents, are also prone to reward similar others in return for kind actions; by the same logic agents that prefer to
match with dissimilar others would be expected to reward similar agents less. We ﬁnd evidence for both intuitions,
although only in the case of homophilous agents the effect is statistically signiﬁcant.
Result 3. Under endogenous matching, in-group biases can be found only among homophilous agents, who are more positively
reciprocal towards the in-group than towards the out-group.
5. Discussion
5.1. On the sources of homophily
Within our minimal design, homophily is certainly not a matter of opportunities or stereotypes. Agents meet according
to a matching process which is in all respects anonymous except for group membership (RED or BLUE) and the way in which
agents affect probabilities according to their declared wtp; likewise, the way in which agents are assigned to the BLUE and
RED group is independent of any individual characteristic of participants. In Section 3 we have also seen that in our minimal
design homophily is not driven by the strategic reaction to the anticipation of in-group biases. Hence we can rule out all of
these as possible channels behind homophily in our experiment. In this section we develop and discuss some (evidence-
based) conjectures on what the roots of homophily might be, and relate them to the results of the previous section.
We start by reporting the results from the post-experimental questionnaire in which we elicited risk aversion of par-
ticipants. As a measure of risk aversion we use a variable that counts in how many Holt–Laury style lottery choice questions
in the questionnaire the participants preferred a sure outcome to a non-degenerate lottery.18 The questions can be found in
Appendix C.1. The variable ranges from 0 (least risk averse) to 7 (most risk averse). It should be noted that this is a non-
incentivised measure. Table 7 shows the distributions of the variable risk aversion in treatments ENDO and EXO, which are
remarkably similar (see also Fig. 7 in Appendix A).
Participants with a higher willingness to pay for an in-group match are more risk averse (Spearman test ρ¼ 0:3586###).
Fig. 6 (left panel) illustrates the predicted values of a linear regression, where we explain the wtp for an in-group match via
Fig. 5. In treatment ENDO in-group biases are only found when restricting to homophilous agents. Stars indicate signiﬁcance level according to two-sided
ranksum test comparing in- and out-group matches nnn1%, nn5%, n10%. effect sizes are as follows: strictly homophilous: 0.17 in G3–G4, 0.42nn (G5–G6);
neutral: 0.11 (G3–G4), 0.19 (G5–G6); heterophilous: 0.25 (G3–G4), $0.31 (G5–G6). As a robustness check we also do this analysis for stated preferences
only and ﬁnd the following effect sizes: weakly homophilous 0.18n (G3–G4), 0.48nnn (G5–G6); weakly heterophilous 0.07 (G3–G4), $0.114 (G5–G6).
18 Since all the lotteries were presented to participants on the same page and ordered according to the implied CRRA range, we observe very few
instances (less than 1%) of multiple switching.
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the risk aversion variable, as well as data points in risk aversion – wtp space. The ﬁgure omits strictly heterophilous agents
and displays ﬁtted lines from two regressions – one without and one with a square term. Clearly, the wtp for an in-group
match seems to increase with an agent's risk aversion.
We also conducted a cognitive reﬂection test in the questionnaire and found no signiﬁcant correlation between cognitive
reﬂection and a binary measure of homophily nor between cognitive reﬂection and willingness to pay. Table 8 shows OLS
regressions, where we regress the wtp for homophilous agents on all our questionnaire variables. It can be seen that the only
variable that is signiﬁcant is the degree of risk aversion of the participant. We run three different regressions where we
control for different sets of questionnaire variables. The estimated coefﬁcient on our risk aversion variable is pretty stable
across all these.
Result 4. Homophily is positively correlated with risk aversion.
To get some independent evidence of this correlation we posted a questionnaire on Amazon Mechanical Turk (AMT) in
January 2014.19 We asked participants a simple question about their risk preferences, namely “How willing are you in
general to take risks”? This question has been found to explain risky behaviour, such as holdings stocks, smoking and
occupational choices better than other standard measures of risk aversion (Dohmen et al., 2011). We use the answer to this
question (on a scale from 0,…,7) to explain respondents' homophily, which we measure with two questions: (i) How
strongly do you prefer to “mix with your own kind”? and (ii) How strongly do you prefer to interact with people similar to
you? also ranging from 0,…,7. The spearman correlation coefﬁcient between these measures is ρ¼ 0:3119##, amazingly close
to the one found in our experiment. Fig. 6 (right panel) illustrates the distribution of data points and the linear regression
found in column (2) of Table 9. Column (1) also controls for gender and age of our AMT respondents.
This evidence points to a possible psychological source of homophily. Suppose agents perceived the behaviour of similar
agents to be more predictable (for reasons to be discussed below). Those who are more risk averse would end up investing
more in relationships with similar others (by declaring a higher wtp), in which they expect ex ante less strategic uncertainty.
Interestingly, an interpretation based on risk aversion as the primitive force behind homophily is consistent with the recent
Table 7
Distribution of the variable risk aversion.
ENDO EXO
0 (Least risk averse) 0.10 0.10
1 0.07 0.08
2 0.29 0.21
3 0.31 0.34
4 0.18 0.17
5 0.02 0.05
6 0 0
7 (Most risk averse) 0 0.01
Fig. 6. Data points and ﬁtted values from a linear OLS regression of the wtp for an in-group match on risk-aversion in treatment ENDO (left panel) and in
the AMT study (right panel).
19 The full questionnaire and details about our respondents and Amazon Mechanical Turk can be found in Appendix C.3.
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sociological theory that explains group identiﬁcation as a reﬂection of agents' desire to decrease their perceived uncertainty
over the outcome of social interaction (Hogg, 2000). Perceptions and beliefs also play a role in recent theories in Economics
on the emergence of homophily (see e.g. Kets and Sandroni, 2014).20
But why should agents believe to better predict behaviour in in-group matches? One possible explanation is that agents
expect in-group interaction to be regulated by behaviours that stabilise outcomes on some implicit norm. Such behaviours
may take the form of harsh punishments of bad behaviour from in-group opponents, possibly grounded in the psychological
distress of having invested resources (wtp) in vain, or in a reaction to unexpected ill treatment from other agents from the
same group. It is not uncommon in reality to see in-group members being punished more harshly than out-group members
for a given behaviour. Through self-selection, risk averse agents tend to cluster in in-group matches, forming disjoint close-
Table 9
OLS regression of homophily indicator on risk aversion, gender and age in our AMT questionnaire with 42 respondents. nnn1%, nn5%, n10% signiﬁcance.
(1) (2)
Constant 3.538nnn 3.057nnn
(1.045) (0.601)
Age $0.024
(0.027)
Gender 0.645
(0.645)
Risk aversion 0.355nn 0.352nn
(0.159) (0.152)
Observations (groups) 42 42
Standard errors in parentheses.
npo0:1.
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
Table 8
Homophily (wtp). OLS regression of wtp on questionnaire variables for 32 homophilous participants in ENDO. nnn1%, nn5%, n10% signiﬁcance.
(1) (2) (3)
Constant 9.766 0.4308 8.0820
(42.376) (11.828) (9.517)
Age 0.121
(1.925)
Gender $9.022
(11.450)
Risk aversion 7.863n 9.6014nn 8.8207nn
(4.382) (3.612) (3.549)
Cognitive reﬂection 2.918 4.4167
(4.688) (4.076)
Observations (groups) 32 32 32
Standard errors in parentheses.
nnn po0:01.
nn po0:05.
n po0:1.
Table 10
Comparison of behaviour EXO and CONTROL (Means). p Values from two-sided ranksum tests.
Games EXO in-group EXO out-group CONTROL p value
EXO vs CONTROL
G1–G2 0.30 0.13 0.22 p¼0.6511
G3–G4 0.18 0.58 0.26 p¼0.3321
G5–G6 0.43 0.08 0.30 p¼0.8316
G7–G8 0.79 0.66 0.74 p¼0.9817
20 Compare with the search based theory of Currarini and Vega-Redondo (2011) and the explanation based on social preferences by Chen and Chen
(2011).
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knit communities within cultural groups. Such communities tend to be characterised by strong social norms, which are
enforced by means of selective punishments and rewards. Phenomena such as the punishing of acting white behaviour
which refers to a person's perceived betrayal of identity can be viewed as instances of such effects.21,22
5.2. The effect of the introduction of groups
Before we conclude we have a brief look at our CONTROL condition where agents played the same 8 games as in EXO and
ENDO, but where no mention was made of different groups. Understanding how behaviour in EXO differs from CONTROL
can help understand how the introduction of artiﬁcial group differences or identities affects behaviour.
Table 10 shows the result of this comparison. In all four categories of games behaviour in CONTROL lies in between
average behaviour in in- and out-groups in EXO. This shows that – at least in our setting – the introduction of different
identities does not lead to substantially different behaviour on average. An exception is the case of negative reciprocity
(Games 3–4), where behaviour in the CONTROL condition is much closer to in-group behaviour in EXO and signiﬁcantly
different from out-group behaviour in EXO (po0:05). Hence the introduction of artiﬁcial identities leads to a loss in welfare
(i) due to an increase in negative reciprocity as well as (ii) due to discrimination (different behaviour in in- and out-group
matches) in our case. This is true only, as our previous results have shown, under exogenous matching conditions.
6. Conclusions
We proposed a minimal design to study homophily in the laboratory and found evidence for homophily in such a design
even in the absence of stereotypes, differing opportunities or the strategic anticipation of preferential treatment by others.
We further studied the connection between homophily and in-group bias. We found that they are tightly linked: giving
homophily a playing ﬁeld (by allowing for endogenous matching) signiﬁcantly reduces in-group biases. Furthermore in-
group biases are only found among agents that are also homophilous. We also found that risk aversion is strongly correlated
with homophily in two independent samples.
These results should be of interest to any social scientist studying discrimination, segregation and the like. They also have
implications for a number of important policy dimensions, especially for situations where matching is an issue. Those include
matching workers into teams, children to schools or social workers or ﬁeld agents to different neighbourhoods. Our results show
that allowing some degree of choice in who to work with, can reduce in-group biases and hence discrimination at the work place.
Our results have also shown, though, that whether or not discriminationwill be reduced depends on the incentives (whether or not
there is scope for positive, negative reciprocity etc.). In addition, of course, other factor that were blended out in this experiment,
need to be considered as well, such as information asymmetries between different groups or complementarities in skills etc. The
interaction of such effects with the parameters considered in this experiment should be understood in future research.
Future research, both in the lab and in the ﬁeld, is also needed to understand the sources of homophily and the reasons
why in-group biases decrease with homophily at work through endogenous matching. One direction for this research could
lie in the theory brought forward in this paper which is based on two assumptions: in-group interactions among homo-
philous agents obey behavioural norms and deviations from these norms are harshly punished (hence the reduction in in-
group bias). Secondly, these norms (seem to) make behaviour in in-group matches more predictable, hence providing a
motive for risk averse agents to be homophilous.
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Appendix A. Supplementary data
Supplementary data associated with this article can be found in the online version at http://dx.doi.org/10.1016/j.euro
ecorev.2016.02.015.
21 It is reasonable to assume, of course, that such heuristics are learned in real groups outside the laboratory and triggered in the unfamiliar situation
encountered in the laboratory.
22 Fig. 3 shows that, indeed, there might be more negative reciprocity in in-group matches compared to out-group matches in ENDO, even though the
effect is not signiﬁcant. Consistently with more negative reciprocity, Player A opts out, i.e. does not let Player B choose, more often in in-group matches (56%
of the time) compared to out-group matches (46%) in ENDO (see Appendix B.2). Again, this difference is not signiﬁcant, however.
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